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Abstract 
 
Within the wide literature regarding franchising, a few studies were devoted to the adverse 
selection phenomena in the franchise relationships, and to the signaling explanation of the 
franchisors’ organizational choices. 
Previous empirical works concluded that the signaling framework is not well adapted to 
study franchising. 
However, most of the empirical literature has focused on developed countries.  
This empirical paper deals with the case of Brazil. We estimate on recent franchising data a 
structural equation model capturing the simultaneous influences of a valuable business 
concept. The paper provides evidence that the signaling theory is adequate to understand the 
organizational choices regarding the ownership structure of franchised networks in emerging 
markets. The estimation results suggest indeed that the Brazilian franchisors use signaling 
devices, and that the necessity to signal the value of a business concept affects the 
organizational choices at the network level. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The literature dealing with franchising networks emphasizes the relevance of the theory of 
contracts to understand this major phenomenon. The relationships between franchisors and 
franchisees are indeed characterized by informational asymmetries, and the devices included 
in franchise contracts can be studied as a way to confront these asymmetries. More precisely, 
during the last decades, agency-theoretical explanations in terms of moral-hazards, incentives 
issues and monitoring costs were the dominant direction in franchising research (e.g., 
Brickley and Dark, 1987; Brickley et al., 1991; Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 
1994; Shane, 1996; Combs and Ketchen, 1999; Alon, 2000; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005; 
Castrogiovanni et al., 2006; Pénard et al., 2011).  
On the contrary, within the wide literature regarding franchising, a few studies were 
devoted to the adverse selection phenomena in the franchise relationships, and to the signaling 
explanation of the franchisors’ organizational choices. This situation is highlighted by Table 
1, constructed from a survey of 18 of the top ranked reviews in Economics and Management1.  
 
 
Table 1 
Theoretical frameworks in the literature on franchise data  
 
 
 
Theoretical framework 
Number 
 of related 
articles* 
Agency Theory 36 
Resource Scarcity Theory 18 
Transaction Costs Theory 4 
Signaling Theory 2 
Property Rights Theory 2 
Life Cycle Theory 1 
Other 26 
Not mentioned 1 
*Some articles refer to several theoretical frameworks. 
 
                                                 
1
 Here after in alphabetical order: American Economic Review, Applied Economics, European Economic 
Review, European Management Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of 
Business Venturing, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Retailing, Journal of Small Business Management, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Industrial Organization, Strategic 
Management Journal. 
 
 
3 
 
A total of 87 papers regarding franchising have been counted over the period 2000-2012; 
67 of them are empirical papers. From this literature two major theoretical frameworks 
emerge: agency and resources scarcity theories. Adverse selection and signaling problems are 
only present in two papers.          
This orientation of the literature of the past twelve years is consistent with Lafontaine 
(1993)’s empirical results. Submitting to US data the predictions deriving from Gallini and 
Lutz (1992)’s seminal theoretical model of signal in franchising, Lafontaine (1993) concludes 
that signaling theory is not quite appropriate to study franchising.  
However, over the last four decades, most of the empirical works have focused on 
developed countries. Primarily, the literature relates to the United States where, according to 
Dant et al. (2011), modern franchising dates back to at least 1850. 
A few studies deal with franchising data from emerging countries, while, as mentioned by 
Welsh et al. (2006), emerging markets represent 80% of the world’s population and offer the 
most dynamic potential for long-term growth to businesses, in general, and to franchisors, 
specifically.  
The aim of this empirical paper is to test the signaling theory on Brazilian data in order to 
see if this framework, which is not well adapted to study franchising in developed countries, 
would be more suited to understand this phenomenon in emerging markets. Indeed, the 
previous works dealing with franchising in emerging countries highlight deep differences 
regarding the two groups of countries. 
Table 2 presents the few empirical studies devoted to franchising in Latin-America. Using 
different empirical methods, most of this literature underlines main differences between 
developed versus emerging countries.   
 
Table 2  
Franchising in Latin-America: a survey of the empirical works 
  
 
Authors 
 
year 
 
Studied 
countries 
 
 
Focus 
 
Method 
 
Differences 
highlighted? 
 
Falbe 
& Welsh 
 
 
1998 
 
Mexico 
Canada 
USA 
 
Executive 
perceptions  in 
success and 
failure 
 
 
Covariance  
Factor 
analyses 
 
Yes 
 
Lafontaine 
& Oxley 
 
2004 
 
Mexico 
Canada 
USA 
 
  
Contracts 
customization 
 
Logit Model 
 
No 
 
Dant, 
Perrigot 
& Cliquet 
 
2008 
 
USA 
France 
Brazil 
 
 
Plural form  
 
ANOVA 
MANOVA 
OLS 
 
Yes 
4 
 
 
Cliquet 
& Streed 
 
2011 
 
 
Latin America and 
Mexico 
Asia 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Middle East and 
Africa 
  
 
Retail failures 
 
ANOVA 
OLS 
 
Yes 
 
Michael 
 
2012 
 
Latin America 
 
Development  
 
VAR 
 
- 
 
This is the case with Falbe and Welsh (1998), dealing with three locations: Mexico, 
Canada and the United-States. The authors study the franchisors’ perceptions regarding the 
executive and strategic choices which determine success and failures. Streed and Cliquet 
(2011) address a similar question, and study several emerging countries.  They show that a 
successful expansion abroad requires adaptations to the host market specificities. Dant et al. 
(2008) underline the differences between Brazil, France, and the United-States regarding the 
plural form phenomenon. In addition, studying franchising as an economic development 
strategy for emerging countries, Michael (2012) highlights the differences between 
franchising in Latin America versus in developed countries. Michael (2012) does not use a 
comparative approach, but this author highlights the role of franchising in the economic 
development of Latin America. 
Finally, Lafontaine and Oxley (2004)’s empirical work stands as an exception in this 
literature, because the authors find no main differences comparing franchising in emerging 
versus developed countries. More precisely, these authors investigate the differences between 
the contracts offered in Mexico by North American franchisors, and the contracts offered by 
the same franchisors in their own countries. In this case, the difference is minor. The authors 
show indeed that there is no customization of the franchise contracts for Mexico; thus, more 
than 75% of the sample franchisors require the same franchise fee, whatever the location of 
the franchisees. 
One of the main differences between emerging versus developed countries regarding 
franchising is that the local franchise system is more recent in the first group of countries. For 
example, Dant et al. (2008), using data relating to the year 2004, show that in the United-
States, there was one franchised outlet for 382.63 inhabitants, in France, one franchised outlet 
for 1,708.57 inhabitants, while in Brazil, during the same year, there was one franchised 
outlet for 9,294.74 inhabitants.  
This situation suggests that, because the local franchise system is less developed in Brazil, 
the reputation of Brazilian franchisors is not well established. The theory of signal applied to 
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franchising deals precisely with such kind of situation, being particularly suited for the case of 
young franchising networks.  
The following section of the paper presents in greater details this analytical framework, 
and the deriving testable predictions. Empirical specifications are provided in section 3, 
regarding Brazilian franchising, and regarding the original sample used in this study. In 
section 4, we estimate a structural equation model capturing the specifications related to the 
analytical context. The results, partially consistent with the theoretical framework, are 
discussed in section 5. They suggest that the Brazilian franchisors use signaling devices, and 
that the necessity to signal the quality of a business concept affects the organizational choices. 
The discussion section concludes this empirical paper, and proposes several ways for future 
research.   
 
 
2. Analytical framework and hypotheses development  
 
The theory of information, dealing with the organizational remedies to informational 
asymmetries, constitutes the theoretical background of this paper. More precisely, the paper is 
based on the signaling theory, focusing on the contexts of adverse selection, and on the 
seminal model of Gallini and Lutz (1992) regarding signaling in the franchise relationships.  
Business-format franchising networks are based on a common trademark and concept, 
developed by the franchisor, among legally autonomous downstream units. The success, ie 
the expansion of the network depends on the capacity to attract new franchisees, which is 
related to the profitability of the concept.  
New franchisors with a valuable concept face a problem of asymmetric information. 
Because they have developed the concept, they possess more information about its 
profitability than the potential franchisees. This private information causes a problem of 
adverse selection regarding the type of the franchisors: “good type” with a high value 
business concept versus “bad type” with a low value one. 
When entering a network, the franchisees have to make large investments to specific 
assets. For this reason, they need to acquire information before making their decisions.  
Gallini and Lutz (1992) demonstrate formally that good type franchisors can signal their 
type, and therefore provide relevant information to the future franchisees (Fig. 1). The 
signaling devices are organizational and contractual forms that make the franchisor’s revenue 
highly dependent upon the performance of the business concept. These signaling devices are: 
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the presence of company-owned outlets in the network in addition with the franchised units, 
in other words “dual distribution”, and a high level of royalty rate.  
Two hypotheses derive from this theoretical context: 
 
H1. The proportion of company-owned outlets is positively related to the value of the 
business concept. 
 
H2. The level of the royalty rate is positively related to the value of the business concept. 
 
 
In this analytical context we introduce a gradual learning of information, assuming that the 
first results regarding the profitability of the concept coexist with the signaling period (Fig. 1). 
For this reason, we formulate the following complementary hypothesis: 
 
H3. The performance of the franchised network during the signaling period is positively 
related to the value of the business concept. 
 
In the literature on franchising data, the value of the concept, or the brand name value, is 
often related to the years of the company in business prior to the first franchised unit. This 
experience allows the upstream firm to develop a profitable concept. This is why we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H4. The franchisor’s experience is positively related to the value of the business concept. 
 
Figure 1 presents the assumed timing of events: 
 
 
 
Franchisor 
learns 
his 
type    
 
Franchisor  
send 
a 
signal 
Coexistence of 
signaling period 
with gradual 
learning of 
information 
 
Franchisor type is common knowledge 
               
                                                                                                                             TIME 
                                                                                                                           
     t – 2                     t – 1                         t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
                                      
                                        Period 1                                                                          Period 2 
                        Emerging franchise system                                              Mature franchise system  
                                                                                       
 
Fig. 1. Timing of events 
 
Franchising network reputation 
not yet established 
 
 
Franchising network reputation established 
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3. Stylized facts, sample and measurements 
 
3.1. Brazilian franchising 
 
The central role of Brazil in the economy of Latin-America is well-known. Brazil stands 
indeed as the strongest economy of the zone, with several developed sectors such as 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services. This country is a member of the “BRICS” 
with Russia, India, China, and South Africa (“BRICS”). These emerging economies have 
several common features: a large population, a vast territory with a continental strategic 
dimension, a big amount of natural resources, and a remarkable GDP growth during the last 
ten years.  
The emerging position of Brazil appears also regarding franchising. As presented by 
Figure 2, this country plays a key role in Ibero-American franchising with the highest number 
of franchised brands of the zone, even more important than Spain, where franchise is though 
well present. In addition, as shown by Figure 3, the structure of the Brazilian franchise system 
is dominated by domestic brands (93%), such as for the developed countries and contrary to 
the small economies of the zone such as Ecuador, Guatemala, and Uruguay.  
However, contrary to the case of developed countries, the Brazilian franchise system is still 
small regarding the size of the population. This is highlighted by Figures 4-6 which compare 
for several countries the number of brands, franchised outlets, and the employment in the 
franchise sector per capita. These Figures suggest that the Brazilian franchise system is indeed 
emerging, in other words that it is not yet mature.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The key role of Brazil in Ibero-American franchising  
(Data from: Ibero-American Federation of Franchising - 2010) 
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Fig. 3. A Brazilian franchising system based on domestic brands 
(Data from: Ibero-American Federation of Franchising - 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Emerging Brazilian franchising system (1) 
(Data from: Franchise business economic outlook - 2011 and World Bank)  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Emerging Brazilian franchising system (2) 
(Data from: Franchise business economic outlook 2011 and World Bank) 
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Fig. 6. Emerging Brazilian franchising system (3) 
(Data from: Franchise business economic outlook 2011 and World Bank)  
  
 
3.2. The Data 
 
In this study we use cross-sectional data regarding the year 2012 from the 
Brazilian Franchise Association. The sample consists of 179 franchising networks in a wide 
range of retail and services sectors.  
The study variables derived from the theoretical framework are the proportion of company-
owned units, measured as the number of company-owned units divided by the total number of 
outlets in the network, and the royalty rate, defined as a percentage on the downstream sales 
accruing to the franchisor. Two control variables are included in this study: the network 
experience in franchising, referring to the time that the franchisor had to develop his business 
format, and the franchised network market share, referring to the network performance and 
defined as the proportion of the network turnover in the whole sector turnover. Table 3 
presents the sectors in Brazilian franchising used to construct this variable. 
Summary statistics regarding the four study variables are provided by Table 4. 
 
 
Table 3 
Retail and services sectors in the sample 
 
Sector Number of franchising 
networks 
Mean turnover* 
Personal  Accessories & Footwear  9 83333.33333 
Feeding 16 97812.5 
Bars, restaurants , Pizzerias 6 90833.33333 
Drinks, coffee, sweets 11 45000 
Beauty, health and natural products 16 77512.5 
Communication, Computer, Electronics 9 68333.33333 
Construction and Real estate 12 84558.33333 
Cosmetics and perfumery 6 44333.33333 
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Education and Training 16 46200 
Entailment, toys and leisure 2 125000 
Language Schools 14 49785.71429 
Hospitality and tourism 3 273333.3333 
Care and Cleaning 16 38731.25 
Furniture, decoration and gifts 10 88500 
Business services 14 166214.2857 
Automotive services 5 53200 
Clothing 14 117500 
Total  179 82345.2514 
 
* Brazilian Currency: Real - Brazilian data - 2012 
 
 
  
Table 4 
Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix  
 
 
 
 
N 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Asymmetry 
 
 
Kurtosis 1 2 3  
 
1. Experience 
 
179 
 
1,00 
 
50,00 
 
10,3575 
 
9,56677 
 
0.102 
 
3.045 
 
 
    
2. Company-owned units 179 0,00 1,00 0,1565 0,23278 0.712 3.094 
-0,287a** 
(0,000)b 
 
   
3. Royalty rate 179 0,00 0,50 0,0650 0,06679 0.955 4.941 -0,065 
(0,194) 
-0,051 
(0,248) 
 
 
  
4. Market share 179 0,00 0,60 0,0856 0,09308 0.042 4.629 -0,135* 
(0,036) 
0,125* 
(0,048) 
0,125* 
(0,048)  
 
 
 
a    Pearson Correlation 
b   Significance level in brackets. 
** Significant correlation at level 0,01 (unilateral). 
*  Significant correlation at level 0,05 (unilateral). 
Brazilian data - 2012 
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This Table shows the heterogeneity within the sample networks regarding three variables: 
the proportion of company-owned units, the royalty rates, and the market shares. The 
networks experience is quite homogenous in the sample, as showed by the means, higher than 
the standard deviations for this variable. 
It is interesting to note that the maximum experience is 50 years, even if the majority of the 
sample networks have less than a 10 years experience. However, it is worth mentioning that 
the franchised network with 50 years of experience is not atypical in the sample, because 
several other networks are close to this situation. 
In addition, Table 4 highlights the negative significant correlation between the proportion 
of company-owned outlets and the franchisor’s experience, and between the market share and 
the franchisor’s experience. This second correlation is quite surprising. 
The correlation matrix highlights also a positive correlation between the proportion of 
company-owned units and the network market share. 
According to Lafontaine (1993), a negative correlation sign should be expected between 
the royalty rate and the proportion of company-owned outlets. This is the case here, but the 
correlation is not significant. 
The structural analysis requires the use of normally distributed data. In order to solve the 
problem of normality highlighted here by the asymmetry of the variables and the kurtosis 
values, we use a  transformation2.   
 
 
4. Contractual and organizational choices as signaling devices 
 
4.1. Method 
 
In order to submit to data the hypotheses deriving from the signaling theory, we use the 
structural equation modeling method (SEM) which allows to estimate simultaneous equation 
models including latent variables. As mentioned by Animesh et al. (2011), Bollen (2011), 
Squalli et al. (2010), SEM provides rigorous analyses for model fitting. 
The value of a business concept can’t be inferred directly and constitutes thus the latent 
variable (η ) of our econometrical model. According to hypotheses 1 and 2, this variable 
influences the royalty rate and the proportion of company-owned units in the network, studied 
here as signals sent by the good type franchisors to the potential franchisees in a context of 
asymmetric information regarding the latent variable. We assume that, being contractual and 
organizational choices of the upstream firm, the two signaling devices are stable during the 
                                                 
2
 This transformation is preferred to a Log transformation because several study variables are rates.  
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first period (P1 = {t – 1; t}) where the network reputation is not yet established. For this 
reason, the signals are defined for t – 1 and t. The network market share evolves continuously 
and is taken into account at time t as a performance indicator in line with the value of the 
business concept. The franchisor’s experience is the same at time t and t – 1. This variable is 
introduced in the econometrical model as a proxy for the quality of the business concept. Both 
variables (market share, experience) allow distinguishing good type franchisors. 
The econometrical model is defined as the following system of structural equations: 
 
 
                                  (1) 
 
 
 
Where, 
 refers to the value of the business concept. 
 refers to the intercept in the measurement equation. 
 refers to the regression coefficients regarding the effect of the latent variable on  
 : refers to the effect indicators of the quality of the business concept ( ) 
: refers to the error terms which contain all other influences on  besides . 
The model can be re-written in the next path diagram: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Path diagram of the structural econometrical model 
 
                H1 
                     
H4 H2 H3 
Value of the 
concept 
(t – 1; t) 
 
Experience  
(t – 1; t) 
Company- 
owned units 
(t – 1; t) 
 
  
Royalty Rate  
(t – 1; t) 
 
Market Share (t) 
    
14 
 
 
 
4.2. Results  
 
Table 5 presents several statistics regarding the overall fit of the estimated model.  
 
 
 
Table 5 
Fit Statistics    
 
 Value 
Likelihood ratio  
Model vs. saturated 1.243 
p>chi2 0.537 
Baseline comparison  
Comparative fit index (CFI) 1.000 
Tucker-Levis index (TLI) 1.087 
Size of residuals  
Standardized root mean squared residuals 0.018 
Coefficient of determination 0.575 
 
Brazilian data - 2012 
 
 
 
 
First, like Bollen (2011), we use the likelihood ratio chi-squared test (LR-test) in order to 
check if the model is adequate in the empirical analysis. This test compares the estimated 
model with the saturated one. The results show that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis 
according to which the model is as well as the saturated one. In other words, it is not possible 
to conclude that there is a missing path in the model specification. 
In addition, the modification indices test shows that a change in the specification of the 
model is not relevant, and that the model is robust3.  
The comparative fit index and the Tucker-Lewis index indicate that the model has a good 
fit (values higher than 0.95). These results are confirmed by the standardized root mean 
squared residuals (lower than 0.08) and the coefficient of determination (57.5%).  
These different and complementary tests allow concluding that the estimated model has a 
good fit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Results available upon request. 
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The detailed estimation results are reported in Figure 8, Tables 5 and 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Empirical results - Brazilian data - 2012 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Regression coefficients and R-squared 
 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| R-squared 
Company-owned units    0.4784019 
Value of concept 0.6916661 0.2414868 0.004  
Constant 1.157124 0.0965745 0.000  
Royalty rate    0.0046433 
Value of concept 0.0681417 0.1131461 0.547  
Constant 1.752034 0.1189998 0.000  
Market Share     0.0495044 
Value of the concept 0.2224959 0.9777507 0.023  
Constant 2.051363 0.1316854 0.000  
Experience    0.2749972 
Value of concept -0.5244017 0.1892347 0.006  
Constant 2.18417 0.1375211 0.000  
 
Brazilian data - 2012 
 
These results suggest that, as predicted by H1, the value of the business concept influences 
significantly and positively the proportion of company-owned units in Brazilian franchising 
networks (p<0.004). The R-squared for this equation is particularly high regarding cross-
sectional data (47.8%). This empirical result supports the signaling explanation. 
On the contrary, the estimations reveal that the value of the concept has no significant 
influence on the royalty rate, which does not support H2.  
Consistent with H3, the value of the concept impacts significantly and positively the 
market share (p<0.023). 
0.2414868 
(0.004) 
-0.5244017 
(0.006) 0.0681417 
(0.547) 
0.2224959 
(0.023) 
Value of the 
business 
concept 
 
 
Experience 
 
Company-owned 
units 
 
Royalty Rate 
 
Market Share 
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Finally, as predicted, the franchisor’s experience in business prior to the first franchised 
unit is empirically related to the value of the business concept, but the negative sign is reverse 
to the predicted one. This result confirms the first empirical outcomes regarding the 
correlation matrix and the negative correlation between the franchisor’s experience and the 
network market share.   
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
This empirical paper estimates a structural equation model on recent Brazilian franchising 
data. The method allows studying the simultaneous influence of the value of a business 
concept on organizational and contractual signaling devices, and on the market share of the 
franchised network, taking into account the relationship between the value of the concept and 
the franchisor’s experience. 
The empirical results show that the estimated model has a good fit, and they provide 
several interesting outcomes regarding franchising in emerging markets. 
First, the results suggest that the organizational choices of local franchisors in emerging 
markets differ from what has been observed so far regarding franchising in developed 
countries. More precisely, the paper provides evidence that signaling may motivate the 
organizational choices in emerging local systems. This result is particularly interesting 
knowing that most of the literature dealing with franchising in the framework of the theory of 
contracts focuses on the agency explanation.  
Two signaling devices were identified in the seminal model of Gallini and Lutz (1992) 
concerning signaling in franchise networks: the royalty rate and the proportion of company-
owned units. In terms of signal, these two devices may be considered as substitutes. Our 
results suggest that this is not the case, and that the franchisors use the organizational form of 
the network (dual distribution) rather than the contractual design (high level of royalty rate) to 
signal the value of their business concept to potential franchisees. 
As predicted, the value of the concept influences positively the market share during the 
signaling period. However, the results regarding the franchisor’s experience are unexpected. 
Instead of a positive relationship between the franchisor’s years in business prior to the 
development of the franchised chain, a negative one is estimated. 
The explanation may rely on the context of this study, which deals with an emerging 
market. It is indeed relevant to suggest that in Brazil, the business environment being 
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particularly dynamic, the maturity time of a valuable business concept is lower than in 
developed countries. 
Moreover, our results suggest that local business owners with a valuable concept settle 
quickly their franchised network into a very dynamic environment where consequently 
competition is strong and where market shares are being distributed. In this context, the “good 
type” franchisor is both the one who possesses a profitable concept, and who is able to impose 
it quickly in the form of a franchised network. 
Several limitations of our study have to be mentioned, interesting for further researches. 
First, our empirical investigation is limited by the cross sectional data. The availability of 
panel datasets regarding emerging countries would allow consideration of the evolutions, 
especially when the franchise system enters its mature phase. 
In addition, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to other Latin American countries 
with different levels of economic development. 
Finally, our results show that the signaling theory is adequate to understand the 
organizational choices regarding the ownership structure of franchised networks in emerging 
markets. However the issue concerning the required level of company-owned units is not 
addressed here. Further empirical researches could deal with this issue and provide evidence 
regarding the proportion of company-owned units required to act as an efficient signaling 
device. 
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